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Paradoxically, [WeKo] was also engaged in efforts to foster "unity from above." The East German Communists postulated that since both the Social Democrats and the Communists were opposed to what the SED's propaganda called Konrad Adenauer's "military-clerical dictatorship," the two parties could and should cooperate to end the chancellor's and the Christian Democrats' rule. According to some SED leaders the chances for "unity from above" were good because the SPD's leadership was a house divided against itself. An "American" (or sometimes "Anglo-American") faction (Carlo Schmid, Wilhelm Kaisen, Max Brauer, Willy Brandt) represented the extreme form of "Social Democratism." In contrast, the SED claimed that the SPD's chairman, Erich Ollenhauer (who had succeeded [Kurt Schumacher] in 1952), and his supporters showed "indications of appreciating Soviet policies toward Germany."11 Supposedly, Ollenhauer also favored direct contacts between the Social Democrats and the East German Communists. The aim of the "unity from above" campaign was to drive the members of the "American faction" from their positions of influence, while strengthening the role of the Social Democrats' "more realistic" leaders.12 Hoping to exploit the (nonexistent) divisions within the SPD's leadership, between 1946 and 1959 the SED sent a steady stream of letters (55 in all) to the SPD's Executive Committee. The message was always the same: In the face of the growing threat of imperialist aggression the two German working class parties needed to cooperate to strengthen the forces of peace and democracy.